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APPEAL FROM THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE ROGER LIVINGSTON 
PRESIDING, WHEREIN THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED 
THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN AN "OCCURRENCE" UNDER 
THE INSURANCE POLICY 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the notice of 
appeal must be filed within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from. 
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The record shows that Milbank submitted a proposed order 8-19-02. It appears 
that the trial court signed that order on August 21, 2002 however the order was never 
placed in the file. (See Exhibit 1, Affidavit of Michael Holman.) 
Counsel for the accused student made diligent efforts to keep track of the original 
order. Counsel's's secretary was informed on multiple occasions by the trial court's clerk 
that the order submitted on August 19, 2002 had not been signed. The lack of signing of 
this order, or its absence from the file, is confirmed by the letter from Milbank's counsel, 
attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
Following the trial court review of the objections to Milbank's proposed order the 
trial court signed the order and judgment on October 4, 2002 and that pleading went into 
the file. Note on the docket text attached as Exhibit 3 that when the court signed the 
October 4, 2002 order this signing was reflected in the docket text on the October 4, 2002 
entry. Comparing this entry with the August 19 and 21, 2002 entries on the docket text 
shows that there is no indication that the order had been signed. 
This case involves a scenario where a judgment was apparently signed on August. 
19, 2002 but not entered on the docket or placed in the file until some unknown later 
date. Meanwhile the parties continue to litigate the question of whether the proposed 
judgment accurately reflected the trial court ruling. A judgment is not "entered" when no 
one knows or reasonably could know that the order has been signed. 
This case is far different from Auto Control Prods. Corp., v. Tel-Tech. Inc., 780 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989) where the attorney for a party can be accused of failing to 
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periodically check with the court as to the date of entry of judgment. This instant appeal 
involves a case where the counsel for the accused did in fact exercise extreme diligence 
in keeping track of the original order which was signed but not placed in the file. 
Rule 5 8A© of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part that "A 
judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes,..., when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation 
of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket." The same rule at 
subsection (d) provides that the party preparing the judgement shall serve a signed copy 
on the opposing party pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This 
subsection goes on to provide that subsection © shall not affect the time for filing a notice 
of appeal. 
As evidenced by Exhibit One and Two, Milbank could not give notice of the entry 
of the judgment because Milbank also could not find out if the judgment had been signed. 
This court should either hold that the entry of the judgment did not occur until 
October 4, 2002 or remand for a hearing on how exactly the August 19, 2002 order was 
signed but not reflected in the docket text or placed in the court file. 
POINT IL 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE 
DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
TO THIS CASE 
Milbank argues that this court should affirm based on a theory of collateral 
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estoppel. The trial court received memoranda on this subject but did not rule on the 
issue. For purposes of this appeal the accused minor reiterates the argument he made 
before the trial court. 
The issue presented for consideration by the Court is whether or not the doctrine of 
issue preclusion, sometimes call collateral estoppel, should be applied against the child 
Gary E. Eyre to prevent him from claiming and proving in this action that he is not the 
person who assaulted Alvaro Estrada on or about January 18, 2001 at either 9:00 a.m. or 
12:30 p.m. 
Although varying somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction the doctrine of 
res judicata is comprised of two components, claim preclusion and issue preclusion. 
Macris and Assocs., Inc. v. Neways. Inc., 16 P.2d 1214 (Ut. 2000). Both doctrines 
involve the important public policy of preventing the relitigation of previously litigated 
matters, specifically claims and issues. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 
P.2d731,733. 
Claim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a 
claim that has been fully litigated previously. Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs. 
2001 UT. 108. Issues preclusion (collateral estoppel) prevents the relitigation of issues 
in a subsequent action. 
For issue preclusion to apply three elements must be met. First, both cases 
must involve the same parties or the privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
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have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgement on the merits. 
Issue preclusion generally requires proof of four criteria: 
1. The party against who issue preclusion is asserted must have been a 
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; 
2. The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one 
presented in the instant action; 
3. The issue in the first action must have been completely, fully, and fairly 
litigated; 
and 
4. The first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Culbertson. 
Collateral estoppel differs from claim preclusion in that it is an equitable 
doctrine which should be "applied only when the alignment of the parties and the legal 
and factual issue raised warrant it." Nations v. Sun Oil Co., 705 F.2d 742, 744-45 (5th 
Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983). 
Some courts rephrase the foregoing to include a requirement that collateral 
estoppel should only be applied when "...there is no special circumstance that would 
make it unfair to apply the doctrine." United States v. Shanbaum, 10 F.3d 305, 311 (5th 
Cir. 1994). 
Being an equitable doctrine, collateral estoppel should not be applied 
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mechanically, but rather should be applied in a flexible and elastic manner to promote 
justice, not to subvert it. C.J.S., Judgments, Sec. 779 The application of collateral 
estoppel should not result in unfairness or injustice. C.J.S., Judgments, Sec. 782. 
Further, a judgment is not final if a proceeding for relief is pending. C.J.S., Judgments, 
791. 
The Third Party Plaintiff in this matter raises a number of reasons why 
collateral estoppel should not be applied as requested by Milbank. 
First, there is some doubt about whether the confidential records of the 
Juvenile Court can even be introduced in evidence in this matter. The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals so held in interpreting New York law in Green v. Montgomery, 219 
F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2000). Utah law appears to be silent on this subject. However, 
important public policy considerations militate in favor of such a rule in Utah. The 
purpose of Juvenile Court is to aid and assist minors. 
Second, the record in this matter shows an absolutely abysmal defense 
during the course of the Juvenile Court proceedings. The record and the facts cited supra 
paint a picture of a defense counsel who failed to make any effort to suppress the alleged 
confession, either for involuntariness or failure to provide counsel or cease the 
interrogation once the child had invoked his right to counsel, who only spent two and one 
half minutes with the child in preparation for the adjudication, who never even discussed 
the alleged confession with the minor, who did not move to suppress the identification of 
this child as the perpetrator even though the child did not even match the description of 
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the alleged assailant (see page one of Exhibit A attached to Milbank's Motion which 
shows the alleged assailant to be tall, brown eyes, black hair, skinny while this child is 
short, heavy set, blonde and has blue/green eyes, (Depo. Tr. 1-3-02 at 62, 81-82, 
attached hereto as Exhibits 16 and 17, respectively), who did not move for a continuance 
to gather additional evidence after the time of the alleged assault was changed from 12:30 
p.m. to 9:00 a.m., the change in theory occurring on the morning of the adjudication, 
thereby negating the alibi evidence that the minor had brought to court in the form of a 
teacher who could vouch for his whereabouts at 12:30, and who did not even advise the 
minor that he had the right to appeal. The court should also note that there is no 
indication in the record that Judge Oddone ever advised the minor of the right to appeal. 
The equities in this case show a child who was coerced into signing a bogus 
confession due to coercion and was then given a 'trial" that can only be considered 
substandard due to the performance of the appointed counsel. When this court considers 
that facts in the light most favorable to the child one can only recoil in horror at the 
thought of what happened to this child. To now try to use collateral estoppel to prevent 
this child from clearing his name and to obtain a huge monetary judgment that could 
saddle the child with an unbearable financial burden for the rest of his life is 
unconscionable. Equity requires justice and fairness. There is nothing fair or just about 
what Milbank is trying to achieve through invoking collateral estoppel. 
The child in this case asserts that because of the ineffective assistance he 
received from appointed counsel in the juvenile court that the issue of whether he was the 
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person who intentionally assault Alvaro Estrada was not completely, fully and fairly 
litigated. "Fairly litigated" raises the specter of a due process violation. The 
representation that this child received, based on this record, precluded the possibility of 
fair litigation. 
Third, the minor was deprived of his right to appeal. Neither the appointed 
attorney or the juvenile court judge advised the minor of his right to appeal, which he 
would have done, if he had been so advised. 
Fourth, the judgment is not really final until the Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief is fully adjudicated, especially given that the child was deprived of his right to 
appeal. In Bell v. Dillard Department 'Stores, Inc. 85 F.3d 1451 (10th Cir. 1996) the 
Tenth Circuit recognized that the lack of an opportunity to appeal means a litigant has not 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 
While not specifically talking about a litigant who was deprived or his right 
to appeal due to failure of counsel or the judge to so advise, the court does seem to 
approve the concept that "In similar situations where a defendant's opportunity for 
appellate review has been foreclosed, Illinois courts have excepted the litigant from 
general collateral estoppel rules and allowed the matter to be relitigated.", citing Henry v. 
Rvan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 252 (N.D. 111. 1991). 
In the Restatement of the Law, Second, Judgments, Sec. 28 it is recognized that 
one of the exceptions to the application of the doctrine of issue preclusion arises when " 
...the party sought to be precluded, as a result of... special circumstances, did not have an 
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adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial 
action. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
MILBANK 
The factual findings to be employed and the standard of review to be applied to 
this case are outcome determinative however, the application, or non application of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine will determine which facts are to be applied. 
The facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the non moving party. 
The Appellate Court should review the applicable law de novo affording no 
deference to the trial court. 
The base facts of this case (assuming that collateral estoppel is inapplicable), as set 
forth in detail in the accused minor's opening brief and his Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment and supplement in his opposition to summary judgment filed in the 
trial court, bear little resemblance to the recitation set forth in the Milbank brief, pages 2 
through 7, except with respect to the policy language. 
The record reflects important facts which in fairness should be included, especially 
when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the accused minor. These facts 
include, but are not limited to: 
1. That the alleged victim's original version of the story was that he had fallen 
from his wheelchair while reaching for a catheter. No reference is made to this fact in 
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Milbank's brief. 
2. That the police never became aware of the original story. 
3. That the mother then had a 'Vision" of something bad happening at school, 
followed by a claim by the alleged victim that he had been attacked by a group of boys. 
4. That the police never became aware of this fact. 
5. That the minor was picked from a yearbook, coerced into a confession and 
adjudicated culpable based upon less than excellent representation at the Juvenile Court. 
In summary, the facts when viewed as they must be viewed, in the light most 
favorable to the accused minor, narrate a tragic story involving two teen aged males, one 
disabled and wheelchair bound, the other a seemingly normal teenage kid until the advent 
of this case. 
The injured minor reached for his catheter and fell hard onto the floor of West 
High School. He went home and began to suffer serious symptoms which led him to be 
rushed to the hospital. The injured minor told his mother and the hospital staff that he 
had fallen from the wheelchair. 
While the injured minor recovered from the injuries his mother had a 'Vision" that 
the injured minor's injuries had been occasioned by a more sinister force. First, she got 
the accused minor to say he had been attacked by a group of boys. Later, it became one 
boy. Then came the yearbook and the boy who had fallen from his wheelchair and then 
been manipulated by his mother into claiming an assault faced a dilemma. Tell the truth, 
which would require a disabled lad to contravene his loving mother and admit he had lied 
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about the physical attack, which attack originated in the mother's mind, or pick out a 
picture from the yearbook. 
The accused minor was then called to the office to be interrogated by a police 
detective who had no idea that the original story was an accidental fall which morphed 
into a group attack, which then transmuted into an attack by a single boy and that all of 
this had resulted from the mother's 'Vision9'. 
The accused student confessed falsely, under duress, based upon a promise that he 
would not be imprisoned if he would just say he did it. 
The accused student was then adjudicated culpable by the Juvenile Court and 
severely punished. The quality of defense representation is already in the record and will 
not be discussed further, except, suffice it to say that the defense was as "in the dark" 
regarding the origin and source of the allegation as the police. 
This litigation then ensued and ultimately, Milbank also became aware of the 
actual chain of events. 
For purposes of Summary Judgment, unless collateral estoppel is applied against 
the accused student, the facts clearly show a false accusation against the accused student. 
This case involves a factual scenario so unusual that it is highly unlikely the 
insurer ever conceived of said scenario when the policy language was drafted. In 
essence, this case involves an accidental injury by the injured student, followed by a false 
claim against the insured. The accused student is entitled to a defense, and also 
indemnification, based upon the fact that there was an occurrence, which is an injury 
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occurring by accident. Further, Milbank contracted to defend frivolous and groundless 
lawsuits. Therefore, Milbank had an obligation to defend this case. 
CONCLUSION 
There was an "occurrence" because there was an accident (fall from wheelchair) 
which resulted in a bodily injury. Equitable principles should preclude the application of 
collateral estoppel. The trial court erred by granting summary and declaratory judgment 
to Milbank. 
WHEREFORE, Third Party PlaintifFAppellant prays that this Court reverse the 
trial court's judgments or in the alternative, that this Court remand for an evidentiary 
hearing to establish all relevant facts related to the processing of the August 19, 2002 
DATED this 2Jh day of April 2003. /j 
ROBERT BREEZE ^ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I mailed//hand delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing to: 
Attorney for 3rd Party Defendants/ 
Appellees 
Attorney for Plaintiff: 
Roger Bullock 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorney for Milbank Insurance Company 
Boston Building, Sixth Floor 
Nine Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Michael a. Katz 
Michael Richman & Associates 
Attorney for Myrta Rosas and Alvaro Estrada 
5684 South Green Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
this 2^h day of April 2003. 
ADDENDUM 
1. Affidavit of Michael Holman. 
2. Letter from Milbank's counsel dated March 4, 2003. 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL HOLMAN 
1. My name is Michael Holman. I am employed by attorney Robert Breeze as his 
secretary and was so employed at the time the of the hearing on Milbank's Motion for Summary 
Judgment August 5, 2002. 
2. After our office received the proposed Order on Summary Judgment on or about 
August 23, 2002 I was instructed by Mr. Breeze to contact the Court to see if an Order granting 
Milbank's Motion had been signed and filed with the Court. 
3. Within a week after the submission of Milbank's proposed Order I called the Court 
to inquire if the Order had been signed and filed. I continued to contact the Court by phone and 
in person three times a week thereafter until the second order was signed on October 4, 2002. 
4. Approximately 10 days after Milbank's "original" proposed Order was filed with the 
Court, I went to the Court and got a docket text printout of the case and saw an entry that an 
Order granting Summary Judgment in favor of Milbank had been filed. I then asked the clerk at 
the front counter of the civil division on the first floor of the Matheson Courthouse for a copy of 
the Order. The file was not downstairs and I was directed to talk to Judge Livingston's clerk on 
the third floor where the file was located. 
5. The clerk at the front desk retrieved the file for me and I went through the entire file 
twice looking for the Order Granting Summary Judgment and it was not there. I then spoke to 
Judge Livingston's clerk, a tall blond woman in her mid thirties who I believe her name to be 
Sally. I explained to Sally that there was not a signed order, even an unsigned Order in the file. 
She also looked through the file to confirm this fact. Sally explained to me that the notation on 
smiRiT wn (0,/v^J 
the docket that the Order had been filed only meant that the Order had been filed with the Court 
and that when the Order was signed by the judge another entry would be made on the docket 
indicating the Order had been signed and entered in the Court's file. 
6. I made additional trips to the Court in person, and regularly called, and was unable to 
find any indication that the first Order had been signed or entered. 
7. I have attached hereto and initialed the docket texts I obtained while trying to track 
the first Order. 
State of Utah ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) itidJkU1. 
MICHAEL HOLMAN ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by MICHAEL HOLMAN this %}}lh day of 
April, 2003. 
SUSAN FAITH CARTER 
NOTARY PUBLIC - STATE OF UTAH 
356 East 900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
My Comm, Exp. 6-1 -2003 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES:^) t (03 
Notary Public, State of Utah 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
C:\RBB\A_State\Eyre\AFFmike4-24-03 
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URRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
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Plaintiff - MYRTA ROSAS 
Represented by: A JOHN WITKOWSKI 
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CCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
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REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 
Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Amount Credit: 
Balance: 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
TAPE 
135.00 
135.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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120.00 
0.00 
0.00 
COPY 
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15.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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3 NUMBER 010906579 Personal Injury 
:EEDINGS 
31-01 Judge FREDERICK assigned. evangelb 
31-01 Filed: Complaint No Amount evangelb 
31-01 Fee Account created Total Due: 12 0.00 evangelb 
31-01 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 12 0.00 evangelb 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
31-01 Judge LIVINGSTON assigned. evangelb 
31-01 Filed: Complaint evangelb 
27-01 Filed return: Summons heaths 
Party Served: EYRE# GARY 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: August 22, 2001 
L0-01 Filed: Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b) (6) and 
12(b)(7) URCP. christef 
L0-01 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) URCP. christef 
24-01 Filed: Motion For Order To Amend Complaint lynm 
28-01 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision to file Amended Complaint.christef 
Dl-01 Filed: Objection to Notice to Submit for Decision. christef 
Dl-01 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Order to Amend 
Complaint. christef 
34-01 Minute Entry - MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT christef 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
Clerk: christef 
Court grants Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint over the 
objection to the notice to submit for decision filed by Attorney 
for the Defendant. Attorney for the plaintiff to prepare the 
order. 
17-01 Filed: Order Granting Leave To Amend Complaint lynm 
24-01 Filed return: Summons to Gary Eyre christef 
Party Served: Gary Eyre 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: October 18, 2001 
07-01 Filed: Affidavit of Impecuniosity. christef 
07-01 Filed: Third Party Complaint. christef 
07-01 Filed: Answer betsyc 
GARY EYRE 
09-01 Filed: Answer to First Amended Complaint christef 
GARY EYRE 
06-01 Filed return: Summons christef 
Party Served: CT Corp, receptionist 
Service Type: NonPersonal 
Service Date: November 07, 2001 
10-01 Filed: Answer of Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance 
nted: 09/11/02 13:57:08 Page 2 
ASE NUMBER 010906579 Personal Injury 
Company. christe: 
DOES I-X 
2-19-01 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Gary Eliott Eyre. christeJ 
2-27-01 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Gary Elliott Eyre. christei 
1-03-02 Filed order: Stipulated Case Management Order lynm 
Judge rlivings 
Signed January 02, 2002 
1-03-02 Filed: Certificate of Service. christei 
1-08-02 Filed: Plaintiff's Designation of Fact Witnesses. christei 
1-09-02 Filed: Certificate Of Service Of Rule 26 Initial Disclosures Of 
Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance Company lynm 
1-24-02 Filed: Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice. christei 
1-24-02 Filed: Certificate of Service of Designation of Fact Witnesses 
of Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance Company. christef 
1-24-02 Filed: Third Party Plaintiff Gary E. Eyre's Certificate of 
Initial Disclosure and Further Disclosures. christef 
1-24-02 Filed: Third Party Plaintiff Gary E. Eyre's Designation of Fact 
Witnesses. christef 
1-31-02 Filed order: Order Of Dismissal Without Prejudice lynm 
Judge rlivings 
Signed January 31, 2002 
1-31-02 Case Disposition is Dismissed lynm 
Disposition Judge is ROGER A. LIVINGSTON lynm 
Filed: Plaintiff's Designation of Expert Witnesses. christef 
Filed: Third Party Plaintiff Gary E. Eyre's Notification of 
Expert Witness. christef 
Filed: Certificate of Delivery of Notice of Third Party 
Plaintiff's Expert. christef 
Filed: Notice of Taking Deposition (3). christef 
Filed: Notice of Taking Deposition. christef 
Filed: Amended Notice of Taking of Deposition. christef 
•21-02 Filed: Motion For Summary Judgment Of Third Party Defendant 
Milbank Insurance Company lynm 
Filed: Memorandum Of Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance 
Company In Support Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment lynm 
5-21-02 Filed: Request For Hearing On Milbank Insurance Company's 
Motion For Summary Judgment lynm 
5-29-02 Filed: Gary E. Eyre's Oppositoin to Milbank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
5-29-02 Filed: Motion for Hearing on Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
5-30-02 Filed: Motion for Order Granting Leave to Amend Third Party 
Complaint to Name Additional Third Party Defendant. christef 
5-30-02 Filed: Complaint of Third Party Plaintiff Gary Elliott Eyre 
Against Third Party Defendant Kim Rilling. christef 
5-06-02 Filed: Notice of Hearing. christef 
5-06-02 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on August 05, 2002 at 
10:00 AM in Third Floor - W39 with Judge LIVINGSTON. lynm 
3-
4-
4-
5-
5-
5-
5-
5-
-29-
- 0 1 -
- 0 1 -
-16-
-17-
-20-
- 2 1 -
- 2 1 -
-02 
-02 
-02 
-02 
-02 
-02 
-  
-02 
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4-02 Filed: Amended Notice of Taking Of Deposition lynm 
4-02 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Milbank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
4-02 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Milbank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
1-02 Filed: Notice Of Deposition Of Defendant Hugh Lawing lynm 
5-02 Filed: Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Milbank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. christef 
1-02 Filed: Gary E. Eyer's Supplement to his Opposition to Milbank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. christef 
5-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 nicolel 
5-02 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 nicolel 
5-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT christef 
Judge: LIVINGSTON, ROGER A. 
Clerk: christef 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): GARY EYRE 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MICHAEL KATZ 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT B. BREEZE 
Other Parties: ROGER H. BULLOCK 
Video 
Tape Number: 080502 Tape Count: 10:01 
HEARING 
This case comes before the court for hearing on the Third Party 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmnt. 
Response by Mr. Breeze, attorney for Defendant Gary Eyre, heard. 
COUNT: 10:41 
Reply by Mr. Bullock. 
COUNT: 10:47 
Reply by Mr. Katz. 
COUNT: 10:51 
Court denies Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Bullock to prepare order. 
L9-02 Filed: Letter from Roger Bullock with proposed Judgment 
attached lynm 
20-02 Filed: Letter from Robert Breeze Re Proposed Order lynm 
20-02 Filed: Objection to Proposed Order lynm 
21-02 Filed: Memorandum Of Milbank Insurance Company In Response To 
Eyre's Objection To Proposed Order lynm 
21-02 Filed: Summary Judgment In Favor Of Third-Party Defendant 
Milbank Insurance Company And Declaratory Judgment lynm 
21-02 Filed: Plaintiff's Request For A Ruling lynm 
nted: 09/11/02 13:57:10 Page 4 (last) 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALVARO ESTRADA vs. DOES I-X 
hSE NUMBER 010906579 Personal Injury 
URRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
ARTIES 
Plaintiff - MYRTA ROSAS 
Represented by: A JOHN WITKOWSKI 
Plaintiff - ALVARO ESTRADA 
Defendant - GARY EYRE 
Represented by: PAUL H MATTHEWS 
Represented by: ROBERT B. BREEZE 
Defendant - DOES I-X 
Third Pty Defendant - MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY 
Represented by: ROGER H. BULLOCK 
Third Pty Defendant - MILBANK INSURANCE COMPANY 
Represented by: PETER H BARLOW 
:COUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: VIDEO 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid. 
Amount Credit• 
Balance 
TAPE 
136.00 
136.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- NO AMT S 
120.00 
120.00 
0.00 
0.00 
COPY 
15.00 
15.00 
0.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
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Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
Balance: 
: 1 
1 
0 
0 
.00 
.00 
00 
00 
NOTE 
FEEDINGS 
3 1 - 0 1 
3 1 - 0 1 
3 1 - 0 1 
3 1 - 0 1 
3 1 - 0 1 
3 1 - 0 1 
2 7 - 0 1 
1 0 - 0 1 
1 0 - 0 1 
2 4 - 0 1 
2 8 - 0 1 
0 1 - 0 1 
0 1 - 0 1 
Judge FREDERICK assigned. 
Filed: Complaint No Amount 
Fee Account created Total Due: 120.00 
COMPLAINT - NO AMT S Payment Received: 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT-NO AMT SPC 
Judge LIVINGSTON assigned. 
Filed: Complaint 
Filed return: Summons 
120.00 
evangelb 
evangelb 
evangelb 
evangelb 
evangelb 
evangelb 
heaths 
Party Served 
Service Type 
Service Date 
EYRE, GARY 
Personal 
August 22, 2001 
Filed: Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 
12(b)(7) URCP. 
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to 
Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) URCP. 
Filed: Motion For Order To Amend Complaint 
christef 
christef 
lynm 
Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision to file Amended Complaint.christef 
Filed: Objection to Notice to Submit for Decision. christef 
Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Order to Amend 
Complaint. christef 
04-01 Minute Entry - MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT christef 
Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON 
Clerk: christef 
Court grants Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint over the 
objection to the notice to submit for decision filed by Attorney 
for the Defendant. Attorney for the plaintiff to prepare the 
order. 
Filed: Order Granting Leave To Amend Complaint lynm - 1 7 - 0 1 
• 2 4 - 0 1 
• 0 7 - 0 1 
• 0 7 - 0 1 
• 0 7 - 0 1 
Filed return: Summons to Gary Eyre 
Party Served: Gary Eyre 
Service Type: Personal 
Service Date: October 18, 
Filed: Affidavit of Impecuniosity. 
Filed: Third Party Complaint. 
Filed: Answer 
GARY EYRE 
2001 
christef 
christef 
christef 
betsyc 
•09-01 Filed: Answer to First Amended Complaint 
GARY EYRE 
christef 
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2-06-01 Filed return: Summons christe 
Party Served: CT Corp, receptionist 
Service Type: NonPersonal 
Service Date: November 07, 2001 
2-10-01 Filed: Answer of Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance 
Company. christe 
DOES I-X 
2-19-01 Filed: Notice of Deposition of Gary Eliott Eyre. christe 
2-27-01 Filed: Amended Notice of Deposition of Gary Elliott Eyre. christe 
1-03-02 Filed order: Stipulated Case Management Order lynm 
Judge rlivings 
Signed January 02, 2002 
1-03-02 Filed 
1-08-02 Filed 
1-09-02 Filed 
Certificate of Service. christe: 
Plaintiff's Designation of Fact Witnesses. christe: 
Certificate Of Service Of Rule 26 Initial Disclosures Of 
Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance Company lynm 
1-24-02 Filed: Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice. christei 
1-24-02 Filed: Certificate of Service of Designation of Fact Witnesses 
of Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance Company. christe! 
1-24-02 Filed: Third Party Plaintiff Gary E. Eyre's Certificate of 
Initial Disclosure and Further Disclosures. christei 
1-24-02 Filed: Third Party Plaintiff Gary E. Eyre's Designation of Fact 
Witnesses. christei 
1-31-02 Filed order: Order Of Dismissal Without Prejudice lynm 
Judge rlivings 
Signed January 31, 2 002 
L-31-02 Case Disposition is Dismissed lynm 
Disposition Judge is ROGER A. LIVINGSTON lynm 
B-29-02 Filed: Plaintiff's Designation of Expert Witnesses. christef 
1-01-02 Filed: Third Party Plaintiff Gary E. Eyre's Notification of 
Expert Witness. christef 
1-01-02 Filed: Certificate of Delivery of Notice of Third Party 
Plaintiff's Expert. christef 
Notice of Taking Deposition (3). christef 
Notice of Taking Deposition. christef 
Amended Notice of Taking of Deposition. christef 
Motion For Summary Judgment Of Third Party Defendant 
Milbank Insurance Company lynm 
-21-02 Filed: Memorandum Of Third Party Defendant Milbank Insurance 
Company In Support Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment lynm 
-21-02 Filed: Request For Hearing On Milbank Insurance Company's 
Motion For Summary Judgment lynm 
-29-02 Filed: Gary E. Eyre's Oppositoin to Milbank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
-29-02 Filed: Motion for Hearing on Third Party Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
-3 0-02 Filed: Motion for Order Granting Leave to Amend Third Party 
5-16-02 Filed 
5-17-02 Filed 
5-20-02 Filed 
5-21-02 Filed 
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Complaint to Name Additional Third Party Defendant. christef 
0-02 Filed: Complaint of Third Party Plaintiff Gary Elliott Eyre 
Against Third Party Defendant Kim Rilling. christef 
16-02 Filed: Notice of Hearing. christef 
(6-02 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT scheduled on August 05, 2002 at 
10:00 AM in Third Floor - W39 with Judge LIVINGSTON. lynm 
14-02 Filed: Amended Notice of Taking Of Deposition lynm 
14-02 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Milbank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
14-02 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision Milbank's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. christef 
.1-02 Filed: Notice Of Deposition Of Defendant Hugh Lawing lynm 
.5-02 Filed: Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Milbank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. christef 
)l-02 Filed: Gary E. Eyer's Supplement to his Opposition to Milbank's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. christef 
)5-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 15.00 nicolel 
)5-02 VIDEO TAPE COPY Payment Received: 15.00 nicolel 
35-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT christef 
Judge: LIVINGSTON, ROGER A. 
Clerk: christef 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): GARY EYRE 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MICHAEL KATZ 
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT B. BREEZE 
Other Parties: ROGER H. BULLOCK 
Video 
Tape Number: 080502 Tape Count: 10:01 
HEARING 
This case comes before the court for hearing on the Third Party 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgmnt. 
Response by Mr. Breeze, attorney for Defendant Gary Eyre, heard. 
COUNT: 10:41 
Reply by Mr. Bullock. 
COUNT: 10:47 
Reply by Mr. Katz. 
COUNT: 10:51 
Court denies Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Mr. Bullock to prepare order. 
19-02 Filed: Letter from Roger Bullock with proposed Judgment 
attached lynm 
20-02 Filed: Letter from Robert Breeze Re Proposed Order lynm 
Objection to Proposed Order lynm 
Memorandum Of Milbank Insurance Company In Response To 
20-02 Filed 
21-02 Filed 
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Eyre's Objection To Proposed Order lynm 
8-21-02 Filed: Summary Judgment In Favor Of Third-Party Defendant 
Milbank Insurance Company And Declaratory Judgment lynm 
8-21-02 Filed: Plaintiff's Request For A Ruling lynm 
9-11-02 Fee Account created Total Due: 1.00 karries 
9-11-02 COPY FEE Payment Received: 1.00 karries 
9-20-02 Filed: Memorandum of Milbank Insurance Company in Response to 
Eyre's Objection to Proposed Order. christe 
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STRONG & HANNI 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
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NINE EXCHANGE PLACE 
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TELEPHONE (801) 532-7080 
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March 4, 2003 
ESTABLISHED 1888 
GORDON R STRONG 
(1909-1969) 
Direct 323-2004 
e-mail rbullock@strongandhanni com 
1 ALSO MLMBER C O I O R A D O BAR 
2 ALSO MEMBER OREGON BAR 
3 ALSO MEMBLR WASHINGTON BAR 
Robert Breeze, Esq. 
402 East 900 South #1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Milbank State Auto adv. Eyre, Estrada, Rosas 
Dear Bob : 
I have received the brief of appellant in this case and learned for the first time upon 
reading your brief that Judge Livingston entered the written summary judgment on August 21, 
2002. As I recall, I was unable to determine from the Judge's clerk whether the first summary 
judgment had been signed and entered, so I submitted it a second time, and that is the one which 
was signed and entered on October 4, 2002. 
In the interest of representing my client fully, I intend to research whether your 
Notice of Appeal was filed late so as to deprive the Court of jurisdiction, and if so, I expect to 
raise that point in my appeal brief or by motion for summary disposition. 
However, my reason for writing is different. As you know, you have filed a separate 
action by the parents, Gary M. Eyre and Melani Eyre, Civil No. 02090461b' which is pending 
before Judge Timothy Hansen. In the interest of judicial economy, you and I had discussed the 
possibility of consolidating that case with the one which is pending on appeal so they both could 
be decided by the same appeal. Naturally, if your appeal is going to be subject to dismissal for 
late filing, you will not want to consolidate the parents' action with it. 
I simply want to confirm to you that at the time I raised the possibility of 
consolidating the two actions for decision on appeal, I was not aware that Judge Livingston had 
entered the earlier summary judgment so I was not aware of the possible defense of late filing of 
the appeal. In other words, I was not trying to gain any unfair advantage in the parents' action. 
Clearly, no consolidation of the two actions would be appropriate now. 
£XH1BITN0, fb 
March 4, 2003 
Page 2 
As you know, Jim Franckowiak of my office is working on the appeal. Please 
contact Jim or me with any questions. 
RHB/kk 
cc: Jim Franckowiak 
004682 00014 
Yours very truly, 
STRQNCT& HANNT 
Rogeff- H. Bullock 
